A DVPO can be renewed only if the trial court concludes that good cause exists to renew the order and the conclusion must be supported with findings of fact. Where the original DVPO contained no findings of fact and there was no evidence that plaintiff had a legitimate fear of defendant at the time of the renewal hearing, the trial court erred in concluding good cause existed to renew the DVPO. 

The court of appeals reversed a trial court’s conclusion that good cause existed to renew a DVPO, holding there was insufficient evidence presented at the renewal hearing to support the conclusion. The original DVPO in that case was entered by consent and contained no findings of fact. The allegations in the complaint requesting the DVPO did not allege the defendant attempted to cause bodily injury or caused bodily injury, but rather alleged defendant’s conduct placed G.E.M., defendant’s teenaged child, in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or continued harassment. The court stated that “[p]er prior North Carolina appellate case law, a showing of good cause [to renew the DVPO] requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the minor child’s continued, legitimate fear of the defendant.” 



To support the conclusion that there was good cause to renew the DVPO, the trial court made findings that mirrored the findings of fact made in the original ex parte DVPO entered in the case. Those findings of fact were based on allegations contained in the complaint. In addition, 16 the renewal order contained the findings that the “minor child testified that she remains in fear of defendant”, the “minor child testified that she remains in fear of seeing the Defendant out in public for fear of what he might do or say to her,” and the “minor child testified that she remains afraid of receiving physical harm at the hands of defendant.” 

On appeal, the defendant argued there was not competent evidence introduced at the renewal hearing to support the findings of fact and argued that plaintiff failed to show good cause to renew the DVPO. The court of appeals agreed, concluding that there was no evidence introduced at the hearing to support the findings based on the contents of the ex parte order, and concluding that the trial court findings established that the minor child testified about her fear but failed to find that the trial court believed the child was in fear. Noting that a showing of subjective fear, rather than a showing of an objectively reasonable fear, is required for the issuance of a DVPO, the court of appeals held that a trial court’s findings must show that the court believed the plaintiff had an actual fear of the defendant. The mere fact that the child testified that she feared the defendant was insufficient to establish the child’s legitimate, subjective fear. The court of appeals also held that the child’s testimony was “vague” and not “adequate to support a finding that she had a legitimate fear of the defendant.” The child did not testify that she was in fear of the defendant for any of the reasons alleged in the original complaint, included in the ex parte DVPO, or alleged in the motion to renew the DVPO. Instead, she testified that she was “afraid he is going to convince me to come back or he’s going to be sorry or something – he’s best at manipulating,” and that she was afraid he would “listen in on my conversations on my technology and he would, get in my business on technology and stuff.” When asked if she feared physical harm, she admitted that the defendant had never physically hurt her before but that she was “scared that he’s going to get mad at me for doing this and I’m scared he’s going to hurt me or something.” 

The court of appeals does not directly address the question of what a plaintiff needs to fear to establish a legitimate fear, but the court does cite as support for its statement that “a DVPO is appropriate in situations where a person attempts to cause bodily injury or intentionally causes bodily injury, or places one in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or continued harassment.” This indicates that a renewal is appropriate if supported with findings of fact indicating that the plaintiff has an actual fear that the defendant will commit or continue to commit an act of domestic violence.