My Ex is Harassing Me Financially and Damaging My Reputation. Can a DVPO Stop This? | The Law Corner | Raleigh, NC
Precedent Case: Honacher v. Uhlhorn, 911 S.E.2d 253 (N.C. App., December 31, 2024).
Personal jurisdiction, residence, harassment Defendant waived his right to object to personal jurisdiction when he filed an answer and a motion to dismiss without raising the issue of personal jurisdiction. Rule 12(b). Plaintiff’s testimony that she owned a home in North Carolina and regularly spent time in North Carolina established that she had more than “a mere physical presence” in the state and was sufficient to prove she was a resident of North Carolina. Within the context of Chapter 50B, harassment means knowing conduct, directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies, and serves no legitimate purpose. A defendant’s conduct is directed at a plaintiff if the conduct induces a third party to act against plaintiff. Trial court findings that defendant harassed plaintiff seeking to recover a portion of the value of a home purchased while the parties lived together when he had no legal claim to the value, causing her financial damage, anxiety and sleeplessness were sufficient to support the conclusion that he committed acts of domestic violence.
The trial court entered a DVPO against the defendant after concluding he committed acts of domestic violence against plaintiff by placing plaintiff in fear of continued harassment that rises to such a level as to inflict substantial emotional distress. Specifically, the trial court found that the defendant contacted numerous third parties such as realtors and government agencies, making complaints about plaintiff and plaintiff’s property for the purpose of harassing plaintiff, and by placing fraudulent liens on plaintiff’s properties, causing plaintiff anxiety, sleeplessness, and financial harm.
The defendant appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court. On appeal, the defendant first argued that because he was not a North Carolina resident and had not been in North Carolina since 2018, the trial court had no basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over him. The court of appeals held that the defendant waived objection to personal jurisdiction when he failed to raise this issue in his answer or in the motion he filed along with his answer requesting that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Rule 12(b) requires that certain defenses, including a lack of personal jurisdiction, be raised in an answer. The Rule also allows certain defenses designated in the Rule to be raised by a separate motion before an answer is filed. An objection to personal jurisdiction can be raised by a separate pre-answer motion, and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim also can be raised by separate motion. If a separate pre-answer motion is filed to raise any one of the designated motions, all designated motions must be filed in that motion, or they are waived. Because the defendant did not raise his objection to personal jurisdiction in the motion containing his request that the complaint be dismissed for the failure to state a claim, he waived his right to object to personal jurisdiction. Defendant also argued that the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff was a resident of Virginia rather than North Carolina. GS 50B-2(a) allows any person residing in North Carolina to request a DVPO pursuant to Chapter 50B.
The court of appeals first held that the defendant has judicially admitted the issue of plaintiff’s residence in the state when he affirmatively alleged in his answer that she was a resident of North Carolina. However, the appellate court also held that plaintiff’s evidence established her residency. She testified that she owned homes both in North Carolina and in Virginia, and that she regularly spent time in North Carolina, The court of appeals acknowledged that the words “resident, residing, and residence’ have no “precise, technical and fixed meaning applicable to all cases.” The court held that the terms “denote something more than mere physical presence, in which event intent is material.” In this case, her evidence that she owned property and regularly spends time in North Carolina established that she had more than a “mere physical presence” here and was sufficient to establish she is a resident. Regarding the conclusion that he committed acts of domestic violence, the defendant first argued that his actions were not harassment within the definition found in GS 14-277.3A because his actions were not directed at the plaintiff. He contacted third parties and did not contact the plaintiff directly.
The court of appeals held harassment is defined in GS 14-277.3A as conduct directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes or terrifies, and serves no legitimate purpose. Conduct ‘directed at’ a specific person includes communication with third parties intended to induce actions against the plaintiff. In this case, the defendant admitted in his answer and in his counterclaims that he contacted third parties and government agencies to report alleged misconduct on the part of plaintiff and alleged problems with plaintiff’s property. The court of appeals held that these admissions clearly showed that his communications were intended to induce action against the plaintiff. Defendant also argued that his actions were not harassment because he contacted the third parties and government officials for the legitimate purpose of reporting plaintiff’s misconduct and problems with her property.
The court of appeals held that the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant had no basis for his claims against plaintiff; defendant neither appeared in court nor presented witnesses to support his allegations against plaintiff or about plaintiff’s property. Statements in his pleadings supported the trial court’s findings that he acted to harass the plaintiff. Finally, the court of appeals rejected the defendant's argument that plaintiff failed to prove he placed her in fear of continued harassment inflicting substantial emotional distress. The court of appeals stated that the record showed the defendant committed “extortion: he sought to obtain a portion of the value of plaintiff’s home by intimidation and harassment,” causing her to suffer “anxiety and sleeplessness due to [his] continuing, harassing conduct.”




